GORDON GRAHAM ESQ
200 MAIN STREET
SALEM NH 03079

99-E-0220 JERE R. BECKMAN, ET AL v. OYSTER RIVER SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL

Please be advised that on 1/27/2000 Judge Fauver made the following order relative to:

Order-Motion to Reconsider ; Denied
Order on Defendants and Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

SEE ATTACHED.

01/27/2000

Julie W. Howard
Clerk of Court

cc: ANTHONY A MCMANUS ESQ

AOC Form SUCP050 (Rev. 09/03/1999)

The defendants move for reconsideration of the court's December 27, 1999 Order invalidating the results of a vote taken at a Special School District Meeting held on November 16, 1999. The court found that the vote, approving a $19,951,897 bond for construction at the Oyster River High School, was not authorized by section 2.3 of House Bill 111 and failed to satisfy the requirements of RSA 197:3. The plaintiffs object to the defendants' motion, and file a Cross Motion to Reconsider.

The defendants assert that the court failed to consider the legislative history of House Bill 111, in particular, the legislature's intent that any issue raised by the resolution of Claremont could be considered at a special meeting. Specifically, the defendants argue that the bond's affordability was an issue raised by the resolution of Claremont. The defendants point out that opponents of the bond used the uncertainty of the Claremont lawsuit as an argument in support of delaying or defeating the bond vote in March, 1999.

In response, the plaintiffs argue that the legislative history clearly shows the limited purpose of the legislation. In addition, the plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the court's finding that a bond approved at a special meeting validly held under section 2.3 of H.B. 111 need not mature prior to March 31 2000.

The court thoroughly reviewed the legislative history of H.B. 111 before finding the November 16, 1999 vote invalid. Although the defendants quote specific comments made during the meeting of the House Finance committee which support their interpretation of the Bill, the minutes of the meeting should be considered in their entirety. Viewed as a whole, the legislative history demonstrates that the purpose of the special legislation was to give school districts an opportunity to revisit their budgets after the resolution of the Claremont lawsuit, not to consider major bond issues which would encumber a district for a number of years. Although legislative history may be considered in interpreting legislation, specific comments made by individuals are not binding.

In addition, the defendants assert that the court's interpretation of section 2.3 is flawed in that it creates a requirement that issues addressed at a special meeting must have arisen with urgency from the aftermath of Claremont. The defendants argue that the legislature was not concerned with the resolution of Claremont, but rather the lack of a resolution by the time of the annual meetings in March, 1999. As such, no necessity for an emergency or an urgent situation was required by legislation.

The court's discussion in its Order of the "emergency authority" granted by section 2.3 is not meant to suggest that the legislature enacted the special legislation in anticipation of crises arising from the resolution of Claremont. "Emergency" for purposes of RSA 197:3 does not require that there be a "crises." See RSA 197:3, I (b). Rather, "emergency" simply means "a sudden or unexpected situation or occurrence, or combination of occurrences, of a serious and urgent nature, that demands prompt or immediate action, including an immediate expenditure of money." Id. The lack of a resolution of the Claremont lawsuit by March, 1999, created just such an emergency. The legislature was concerned that towns and school districts might be reluctant to proceed with adopting a budget in March, 1999, when there remained a question as to how that money would be raised. House Bill 111 was enacted to allow school district to proceed forward and adopt a budget, knowing that they could later reconvene to adjust that budget if the resolution of Claremont provided them with additional revenue. The authorization given by House Bill 111 to make appropriations was intended to enable the revision of yearly budgets, not the consideration of major bond issues.

Finally, simply because opponents to the bond capitalized on the uncertainty of the Claremont lawsuit to defeat the bond in March, 1999, does not make it an issue "raised by resolution of the claremont lawsuit."

The court has considered, in addition, the arguments raised and the supplemental authority provided in the defendants' Addendum to Memorandum to Reconsider and declines to reconsider its earlier ruling that the vote in this case was not authorized by section 2.3 of House Bill 111.

Accordingly, the defendants' Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

The plaintiffs' Cross Motion to Reconsider is also DENIED. It is clear from both the language and the legislative history of House Bill 141 that section 2.3 is independent from the first two sections of the Bill.

So ORDERED.

Date: 1/27/00

[signed]
Peter H. Fauver
Presiding Justice

Last update on 11-Feb-00 at 9:45 PM.

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